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Abstract
Background: Accumulating evidence suggests that deficits in decision-making and judgment may be involved in several 
psychiatric disorders, including addiction. Behavioral addiction is a conceptually new psychiatric condition, raising a debate 
of what criteria define behavioral addiction, and several impulse control disorders are equivalently considered as types of 
behavioral addiction. In this preliminary study with a relatively small sample size, we investigated how decision-making and 
judgment were compromised in behavioral addiction to further characterize this psychiatric condition.
Method: Healthy control subjects (n = 31) and patients with kleptomania and paraphilia as behavioral addictions (n = 16) were 
recruited. A battery of questionnaires for assessments of cognitive biases and economic decision-making were conducted, as 
was a psychological test for the assessment of the jumping-to-conclusions bias, using functional near-infrared spectroscopy 
recordings of prefrontal cortical (PFC) activity.
Results: Although behavioral addicts exhibited stronger cognitive biases than controls in the questionnaire, the difference 
was primarily due to lower intelligence in the patients. Behavioral addicts also exhibited higher risk taking and worse 
performance in economic decision-making, indicating compromised probability judgment, along with diminished PFC 
activity in the right hemisphere.
Conclusion: Our study suggests that behavioral addiction may involve impairments of probability judgment associated with 
attenuated PFC activity, which consequently leads to higher risk taking in decision-making.
Keywords:  behavioral addiction, impulse control disorder, cognitive bias, probability judgment, prefrontal cortex
Introduction
Behavioral addiction has recently come into the limelight—
along with the inclusion of gaming disorders and Internet use 
disorder, which are prototypical behavioral addictions—with 
its addition into the diagnostic category of addiction in the 
International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision (World 
Health Organization, 2018; Derevensky et al., 2019). Several im-
pulse control disorders, such as kleptomania and paraphilia, are 
also suggested to meet the criteria of behavioral addiction, such 
that these psychiatric conditions are often interchangeably con-
sidered as behavioral addictions (Robbins and Clark, 2015; Grant 
and Chamberlain, 2016; Kardefelt-Winther et  al., 2017; Petry 
et al., 2018). Thus, behavioral addiction is thought to be a con-
ceptually new and premature psychiatric condition, with its def-
inition equivocal and changing, due to insufficient studies and 
insights (Robbins and Clark, 2015; Grant and Chamberlain, 2016; 
Kardefelt-Winther et al., 2017; Petry et al., 2018).
The dual process model has a long history that can be dated 
back to the  pioneering proposals by Pavlov (2010) and Freud 
(1933) almost a hundred years ago. The model explains that the 
human psychological system is roughly divided into 2 processes; 
1 is the intuitive process, which is characterized as fast and 
automatically generated; and the other is the reflective process, 
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which is characterized as conscious and effortful, and yields in-
hibitory effects on the intuitive process (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 
2011; De Neys and Pennycook, 2019; Grayot, 2020). These intui-
tive and reflective processes have been denoted by various no-
menclatures in different studies, such as first versus second 
signals, experiential versus analytical, heuristic versus system-
atic, and system 1 versus system 2 (Evans, 2008). (Hereafter in 
this manuscript, we refer these processes as first vs second sig-
nals, based on the pioneering proposal by Pavlov in 1927 [Pavlov, 
2010]). Given that such a dichotomy of psychological processes 
could be attributed to prefrontal cortical (PFC) cognitive control 
over subcortical, limbic-striatal systems that mediate salience 
and habitual responses, an imbalance of the dual process model 
toward stronger first (intuitive) and weaker second (reflective) 
signals is suggested to underlie the mechanisms of addiction 
(Bechara, 2005; Evans and Coventry, 2005; McClure and Bickel, 
2014). Accumulating evidence suggests that dual process deficits 
with dysfunction of PFC inhibitory control over habitual or pre-
potent responses are indeed involved in addiction (Baicy and 
London, 2007; Ivanov et al., 2008; London et al., 2015; London, 
2020). In addition, a recent mega-analysis investigating impair-
ments of behavioral inhibition in addicted subjects with several 
different substances (alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, amphetamine, 
cocaine, ecstasy) has demonstrated that only lifetime cannabis 
use is associated with suboptimal inhibition. Moreover, lifetime 
cannabis use moderates tobacco’s effect on response inhibition, 
and tobacco use is associated with suboptimal inhibition only in 
cannabis non-users (Liu et al., 2019).
A crucial component of the dual process model is cog-
nitive biases, which are systematic errors or deviations of 
thoughts in judgments and decision-making (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Kahneman, 2011). Cognitive biases are 
primarily associated with the first signal (Kahneman, 2011), 
and present in a range of decision-making and judgment 
scenarios, such as economic decision-making and probability 
judgments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Kahneman, 
2011). A  number of questionnaires and psychological tests 
have been developed to examine cognitive biases, such as the 
cognitive reflection test, which comprises a series of ques-
tions designed to prepotent answers generated from the first 
signal over the second signal (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 
2011), and the jumping-to-conclusions test, in which deci-
sion biases in probability judgments are examined (Garety 
et al., 1991; Lincoln et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2012; Evans et al., 
2015).
Collectively, since cognitive biases are associated with the 
first signal and the imbalance toward an enhanced first signal 
and attenuated second signal is expected to underlie addiction, 
amplification of cognitive biases may be observed in behavioral 
addiction. In this study, we investigated cognitive biases in pa-
tients with 2 specific types of symptoms fitting into behavioral 
addiction: kleptomania and paraphilia. To do so, a set of ques-
tionnaires and a psychological test were conducted, along with 




This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration 
of Helsinki and the Ethical Guidelines for Medical and Health 
Research Involving Human Subjects by the Japanese Ministry 
of Health, Labour, and Welfare. All experimental procedures 
were approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
Kyoto University Primate Research Institute and the Ethics 
Committee of Kyowa Hospital. As controls, a total of 31 healthy 
adult subjects without smoking and psychiatric histories, who 
were either working staff members of Kyowa Hospital (n = 25) 
or undergraduate students in Kyoto University (n = 6), were re-
cruited. For the group with behavioral addiction, hospitalized 
adult patients who were diagnosed with behavioral addictions 
(n = 16) of different symptoms— gambling disorders (n = 1), 
kleptomania (n = 10), and paraphilia (n = 5)—were recruited. 
Upon enrolling into the study, written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants in advance of experiments. 
Patients were diagnosed by the psychiatrist (MW), who has 
been specializing in addiction treatments for more than 
22 years. Patients were diagnosed based on the criteria of both 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fifth Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and the 
International Classification of Diseases, 10th Edition (World 
Health Organization, 1992). A severity level was judged using 
the Japanese version of the addiction severity index (Senoo 
et al., 2006). Experiments were conducted with patients at the 
time of hospitalization during the period between May 2019 
and February 2020. Some patients who had a history of other 
comorbid psychiatric conditions or who could not understand 
the instructions on the administered tests were excluded for 
the study.
A short form of the Japanese version of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale–III, consisting of the information test in the 
verbal comprehension index and the picture completion test 
in the perceptual organization index, was conducted to create 
an estimated full-scale intelligence quotient (eFIQ) of parti-
cipants. Dairoku, Kobayashi, and their colleagues (Kobayashi 
et al., 1993; Dairoku et al., 2008) have demonstrated that the 
use of this short form can reliably create an eFIQ with cor-
relation coefficients of reliability and validity at 0.87–0.88 and 
0.81–0.83, respectively.
A sample structure with regard to the diagnosis, gender, age, 
and eFIQ data is summarized in Table 1.
Significance Statement
Behavioral addiction has recently been gaining extensive attention in society, along with the emergence of new psychiatric con-
ditions of it, such as gaming disorders and Internet use disorder. However, behavioral addiction is still a conceptually new dis-
order, and its criteria have not yet been determined. To further elucidate what characteristics may be associated with behavioral 
addiction, we investigated whether cognitive biases, systematic errors in judgment, and decision making were different between 
healthy subjects and patients diagnosed with kleptomania and paraphilia, which are both psychiatric conditions thought to fit 
into the criteria of behavioral addiction. Our study demonstrates that although there are no clear differences in the cognitive 
biases between behavioral addicts and healthy subjects, behavioral addicts exhibit impairments of probability judgment associ-
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Questionnaires
To assess cognitive biases, 2 paper-based questionnaires were ad-
ministered. First, the extended version of the cognitive reflection 
test was used, which consisted of the original 3 questions from 
the study by Frederick (2005) and 2 additional questions from the 
study by Toplak and colleagues (2011), totaling 5 questions. These 
questions are designed to assess an ability to suppress incorrect 
answers with cognitive biases generated from the first signal, 
and to reach correct answers generated from the second signal. 
The type of answers can be allocated into either a correct answer, 
biased incorrect answer, or irrelevant incorrect answer. Cognitive 
biases were quantified as the Cognitive Bias Index (Bix), which is 
essentially analogous to the discrimination index, with a higher Bix 
indicating a stronger tendency to adhere to cognitive biases. Thus, 
Bix =  (Nb−Nc)/(Nb+Nc), where Nb and Nc are the number of biased 
incorrect answers and correct answers, respectively. Participants 
were asked to answer all 5 questions within 3 minutes.
Second, cognitive biases in economic decision=making 
were examined using a questionnaire consisting of 2 questions, 
Q1 and Q2 below, based on the prospect theory of economic 
decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman, 2011).
Q1. In the following conditions, would you like to bet on a 
tossing coin game at a 50% probability of win/lose?
Q1-1: On the tail, you lose 10 000 Japanese Yen (JPY). On the 
head, you get 20 000 JPY.
(a) Yes, I do. (b) No, I don’t.
Q1-2: On the tail, you lose 20 000  JPY. On the head, you get 
2 000 000 JPY.
(a) Yes, I do. (b) No, I don’t.
Q2. You are going to bet on a tossing coin game at a 50% prob-
ability of win/lose. If you lose 10, 100, 1,000, 10 000, 100 000, or 
1 000 000 JPY at a loss, how much money would you like to get at 
a win in each condition of the loss?
These 2 questions are aimed to assess risk aversion. Q1 is 
further divided into 2 sub-questions, Q1-1 and Q1-2, each of 
which has a pair of choices, so that there are 4 possible combin-
ations of the answers: aa, ab, ba, and bb. In both Q1-1 and Q1-2, 
“a” is risk taking and “b” is risk averse. Q1-1 assesses weaker 
risk aversion (the question with the lower-risk choice) and Q1-2 
assesses stronger risk aversion (the question with the higher-
risk choice). The percentage of participants who made each of 
these combinations of answers was quantified. In Q2, partici-
pants were asked to indicate how much money they wanted to 
gain at a win if they had to bet on a coin toss game with varying 
amounts of money that could be lost. The ratio of the amount 
from a win over a loss in each condition was calculated.
Modified Jumping-to-Conclusions Test
A computer-based psychological test was administered to 
examine the cognitive bias known as the jumping-to-conclusions 
bias—a tendency of decision-making with insufficient informa-
tion gathering (Garety et al., 1991; Lincoln et al., 2010; Evans et al., 
2012; Evans et al., 2015)—for which we modified the original ver-
sion of the jumping-to-conclusions test used in other studies 
(Garety et al., 1991; Lincoln et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2012; Evans 
et al., 2015). In this modified jumping-to-conclusions test, 2 bot-
tles containing 100 beads with red and blue colors in opposing 
ratios in each bottle were shown on the screen; for instance, 
when 1 bottle contained 60 red and 40 blue beads, the other bottle 
contained 40 red and 60 blue beads. Participants were instructed 
to draw beads 1 by 1 from only 1 of 2 bottles by clicking the button 
on the screen for up to 40 beads, without knowing from which 
bottle they were withdrawing. They were also explicitly told that 
every bead drawn was put back into the same bottle immedi-
ately after each withdrawal, so that the ratio was maintained and 
constant. Participants were asked which bottle they believed they 
had been assigned at any time while drawing beads in each trial. 
The instruction and 2 practical trials were given prior to starting 
the session, ensuring that the participants understood the test 
paradigm. A session comprised 40 trials, with varying ratios of 9:1, 
8:2, 7:3, and 6:4 for 10 trials each. The sequence of beads drawn 
in each trial was predetermined pseudo-randomly in accord-
ance with the ratio. The number of beads drawn at the time of 
the decision about which bottle, which reflects the jumping-to-
conclusions bias, and percentages of correct choices of the bottle 
at each ratio were measured.
Table 1. Sample Structure With Regard to Diagnosis, Gender, Age, and Estimated Full-Scale Intelligence Quotient 
Diagnosis Gender n
Age eFIQ
Min Max Mean s.e.m. Min Max Mean s.e.m.
BA PP male 5 29 58 44.0 5.34 61 115 90.4 11.1
female 0 - - - - - - - -
Σ 5 29 58 44.0 5.34 61 115 90.4 11.1
KM male 3 20 24 21.7 1.20 61 97 45.4 5.54
female 7 25 72 83.0 11.1 64 109 82.0 6.75
Σ 10 20 72 38.3 6.25 61 109 82.3 5.42
GD male 1 - - 31 - - - 70 -
female 0 - - - - - - - -
Σ 1 - - 31 - - - 70 -
Σ male 9 20 58 35.1 4.61 61 115 85.7 7.05
female 7 25 72 45.4 5.54 64 109 82.0 6.75
Σ 16 20 72 39.6 3.68 61 115 84.2* 4.88
CT male 13 18 45 32.7 2.79 85 133 103 4.58
female 18 19 58 38.7 2.71 70 118 99.5 2.65
Σ 31 18 58 36.2 2.00 70 133 101 2.44
*Statistically significant difference compared to CT (P < .05).
Abbreviations: Σ, total; BA, behavioral addicts; CT, control subjects; eFIQ, estimated full-scale intelligence quotient; GD, gambling disorder; KM, kleptomania; PP, para-
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Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy
While participants were engaging in the modified jumping-
to-conclusions test, PFC activity associated with the test was 
examined using fNIRS. The NIRO-200 NIRS Image Processing 
and Measuring System (Hamamatsu Photonics K.K.) was used 
in this study. There were 2 emitter probes (E1, E2; delivering 
laser pulses at the wave lengths of 775, 810, and 850 nm) and 
8 detector probes (CH1-CH8), with the distance between an 
emitter and a detector (and thus, spatial resolution) at 3.0 cm, 
which enabled 10 points of recordings (R1-R10; Figure  4a). 
Oxygenated (oxy-Hb) and deoxygenated (deoxy-Hb) hemo-
globin concentrations at the sampling rate of 0.5 Hz were re-
corded in the PFC, spanning over the left and right rostral dorsal 
PFC (corresponding to Brodmann Area 10/9/8), rostral dorsolat-
eral superior PFC (Brodmann Area 10/9), caudal dorsomedial PFC 
(Brodmann Area 6/8), and caudal dorsolateral PFC (Brodmann 
Area 45/46/9) of the MarsAtlas (Auzias et al., 2016; Figure 4a). 
Since prolonged, slow oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes were ob-
served during the test, the area under the curve (AUC)—that 
is, summations of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes over time—
were calculated at each recording site, and subsequent data 
analyses were conducted with the AUCs. Increased oxy-Hb con-
centrations coupled with decreased deoxy-Hb concentrations 
reflect neural activation, whereas decreases of both oxy-Hb and 
deoxy-Hb concentrations are thought to reflect neural inhib-
ition (Villringer et al., 1993).
Data Analysis
Investigators who were not blinded to the experimental con-
ditions conducted the data collection and statistical analyses. 
All statistical analyses were conducted using Statistica soft-
ware (StatSoft, Tulsa, OK). A probability value of P < .05 was con-
sidered as statistically significance. Statistical analyses of the 
data were conducted using both parametric and non-parametric 
tests, depending on measurements. When an analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) was used for the analysis, the post hoc Tukey test 
was conducted for pair-wise comparisons. Since the eFIQ was 
significantly lower in behavioral addicts than control subjects 
(Table  1), when applicable, multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANCOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) were con-
ducted for the analyses in the general linear model, with eFIQ 
as a covariate.
Data Availability
The data sets generated and analyzed during the current study 




The study recruited healthy control subjects (n = 31) and hos-
pitalized patients with behavioral addictions (n = 16) who were 
diagnosed with gambling disorders (n = 1), kleptomania (n = 10) 
and paraphilia (n  =  5; Table  1). The eFIQ of behavioral addicts 
was significantly lower than that of control subjects (unpaired 
t-test, t44 = 3.47; P = .001; Table 1).
Cognitive Biases
To investigate whether cognitive biases were different between 
behavioral addicts and control subjects, the extended ver-
sion of the cognitive reflection test was conducted. Cognitive 
biases were quantified as Bix, which was significantly higher 
in behavioral addicts than in control subjects (Mann-Whitney 
U-test; Z  =  2.09; P  =  .037; Figure  1a), although Bix was not dif-
ferent between kleptomania and paraphilia patients (Figure 1b). 
However, further analysis unveiled negative correlations that 
were present between Bix and eFIQ in both behavioral ad-
dicts (Spearman’s rank order correlation; R  =  −0.770; P  =  .001; 
Figure 1c) and control subjects (R = −0.541; P = .002; Figure 1c). 
Thus, a reanalysis of the data was conducted using an ANCOVA 
with the eFIQ as a covariate. This analysis revealed Bix was not 
different between behavioral addicts and control subjects with 
controlling the eFIQ (F1,43 = 0.030 [P = .864] in behavioral addicts 






























Figure 1. Assessments of cognitive biases with the extended version of the cognitive reflection test. Bar graphs showing comparison of the cognitive bias index (Bix) 
between (A) BA and CT and between (B) KM and PP patients. # indicates statistical significance (P < .05) with the Mann-Whitney U-test, but not when eFIQ is adjusted 
with ANCOVA. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. (C) A graph showing negative correlations between eFIQ and Bix in both behavioral addicts and control 
subjects. The vertical line (|) indicates the data points that overlap. Abbreviations: BA, behavioral addicts; Bix, Cognitive Bias Index; CT, control subjects; eFIQ, estimated 
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addicts was primarily due to a lower eFIQ, rather than enhanced 
cognitive biases.
Higher Risk Taking in Economic Decisions
Studies have shown that people tend to exhibit biased choices to 
avoid risks under uncertainty, where probability judgments are re-
quired (Kahneman, 2011). Risk taking and aversion have typically 
been investigated in relation to economic decision-making. In this 
study, risk taking and aversion in economic decisions were as-
sessed using the 2-question questionnaire with Q1 and Q2, relevant 
to economic decision-making (see Methods for the questionnaire).
First, the percentage of participants choosing answers for 
risk aversion (less risk taking) was examined with Q1, which 
was further divided into 2 sub-questions assessing weaker (Q1-
1; the question with the lower risk choice) and stronger (Q1-2; 
the question with the higher risk choice) risk aversion. In these 
questions, lower percentages of behavioral addicts chose the 
risk aversion answer, as compared to control subjects, in the 
lower-risk question (Fisher exact test; P  =  .088; Figure  2a), but 
not the higher-risk question (P  =  .281; Figure  2a), suggesting 
that behavioral addicts tend to take more risks. No difference 
was observed in the percentages of kleptomania and paraphilia 
patients choosing the risk-aversion answer in these questions 
(Figure 2b). The eFIQ was also not different between those par-
ticipants who were risk averse and those who were risk taking 
in their answers to these questions (Figure 2c), excluding the ef-
fects of an eFIQ difference on answering these questions in be-
havioral addicts and control subjects.
Risk aversion was examined in relation to the amounts of 
gains and losses of money during betting with question Q2, 
in which participants were asked to decide how much money 
they wanted the chance to win if they had to make a bet with 
a specific amount of money at risk for a loss, varying from a 
small (10 JPY, corresponding to approximately $0.1) to a large 
(1M  JPY, corresponding to approximately $10 000) amount. In 
this question, behavioral addicts gave a significantly smaller 
amount needed from a win compared to a loss than control 
subjects when controlling for the eFIQ (MANCOVA with re-
peated measures; F1,41  =  4.18 [P  =  .047] in behavioral addicts 
vs control subjects; F5,205  =  0.780 [P  =  .565] in the amount at 
loss; F5,205 = 0.337 [P = .890] in interaction; Figure 2d). Post hoc 
ANCOVAs that controlled for the eFIQ unveiled significant or 
marginally significant differences between behavioral addicts 
and control subjects in the loss amounts of 10 JPY (F1,42 = 4.55; 
P =  .039), 100 JPY (F1,42 = 3.41; P =  .072), 10 000 JPY (F1,42 = 3.08; 
P = .087), and 100 000 JPY (F1,42 = 4.07; P = .050; Figure 2d), sug-
gesting that behavioral addicts tended to take more risks 
(make bets with a smaller amount available to win) than con-
trol subjects. No difference was observed between kleptomania 
and paraphilia patients in this question (Figure 2e).
These results suggest that behavioral addicts tend to take 
more risks on economic decisions than control subjects.
Impaired Probability Judgments
The jumping-to-conclusions bias was further examined 
using the modified jumping-to-conclusions test, along with 
simultaneously measuring PFC activity using fNIRS. In the 
modified jumping-to-conclusions test, participants were 
asked to guess from which 1 of 2 bottles with red and blue 
beads, mixed at varying ratios from 9:1 to 6:4, they were 
withdrawing the beads. The number of beads withdrawn at 
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Figure 2. Assessments of cognitive biases in economic decision-making. Bar graphs showing percentages of (A) BA versus CT and (B) KM versus PP patients who made 
biased choices in Q1. “Risk Aver” and “Risk Take” indicate risk aversion and risk taking choices, respectively. (C) A bar graph showing a comparison of eFIQs for parti-
cipants who made biased versus non-biased choices in Q1. Graphs showing the relationships between the amount of gain at the time of winning over the amount of 
loss at the time of losing in a bet, as rated by (D) BA versus CT and (E) KM versus PP patients. *P < .05. Abbreviations: BA, behavioral addicts; CT, control subjects; eFIQ, 
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question of which bottle is thought to reflect the jumping-
to-conclusions bias: a tendency of making conclusions with 
insufficient information.
The number of beads withdrawn at the time of decisions 
was significantly increased in both behavioral addicts and 
control subjects when the ratio of beads changed from 9:1 
to 6:4 (Figure  3a). However, there was no difference in the 
number between behavioral addicts and control subjects, 
even after controlling the eFIQ (Figure  3a). Percentages of 
correct responses were significantly or marginally signifi-
cantly lower in behavioral addicts than control subjects 
when ANCOVA was conducted with the number of beads 
withdrawn as a covariate at the ratios of 8:2 (F1,40  =  3.11; 
P = .085) and 7:3 (F1,40 = 5.38; P = .026; Figure 3b), indicating 
that behavioral addicts made more incorrect responses, 
even though they withdrew as many beads as control 
subjects did. An ANCOVA with eFIQ as a covariate resulted 
in no difference in the percentages of correct responses be-
tween behavioral addicts and control subjects, excluding 
the effects of eFIQ on this test. Neither the number of beads 
withdrawn (Figure  3c) nor the percentage of correct re-
sponses (Figure 3d) was different between kleptomania and 
paraphilia patients.
These results suggest that behavioral addicts exhibit a 
similar jumping-to-conclusions bias as control subjects, but 
exhibit impaired probability judgments, so that behavioral 
addicts have difficulty in predicting outcomes based on prob-
abilistic events.
Compromised Prefrontal Cortex Activity Associated 
with the Probability Judgments
Given that previous studies have demonstrated that PFC activity 
is associated with the jumping-to-conclusions bias (Lunt et al., 
2012), we investigated oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes in the PFCs 
of behavioral addicts and control subjects, using fNIRS during 
the modified jumping-to-conclusions test, to address whether 
the differences in test performance between the groups was re-
flected in the neural activity of the PFC (Figure 4a).
Throughout the test, significant decreases in the AUCs of 
oxy-Hb (recording sites R4 and R5 in Figure 4a) and deoxy-Hb (R5, 
R6, R7, R8, and R9) were observed in control subjects, primarily in 
the medial parts of the PFC in the right hemisphere, whereas such 
oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes were essentially absent in behav-
ioral addicts (Figure 4b–d). When the AUCs of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb 
were separately analyzed at different bead ratios, ratio-dependent 
increases of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb concentrations were observed 
in behavioral addicts, but not control subjects, in the recording sites 
R8 and R10, corresponding to the rostrolateral parts of the right PFC 
(2-way ANOVA with repeated measures; F1,31 = 0.031 [P =  .862] in 
Group; F3,93 = 3.79 [P = .013] in Ratio; F3,93 = 4.08 [P = .009] in inter-
action for oxy-Hb at R10; F1,33 = 6.23 [P = .018] in Group; F3,99 = 4.79 
[P = .003] in Ratio; F3,99 = 3.93 [P = .011] in interaction for deoxy-Hb 
at R8; F1,30 = 0.390 [P = .537] in Group; F3,90 = 3.29 [P = .024] in Ratio; 
F3,90 = 3.40 [P = .021] in interaction for deoxy-Hb at R10; Figure 5a–c).
Correlations (Person’s r) in the AUCs of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb 














































































Figure 3. Assessments of the jumping-to-conclusions bias and probability judgment. (A) A graph showing a number of beads withdrawn by BA and CT until making the 
decision to choose the bottle under the variable bead ratios from 9:1 to 6:4 in the modified jumping-to-conclusions test. (B) A graph showing the percentage of correct 
choices under the variable bead ratios. *P < .05. Similarly, there are graphs (C) showing the number of beads withdrawn and (D) the percentage of correct choices in KM 
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Correlations of oxy-Hb in both behavioral addicts and control 
subjects attained normal distributions, with the peaks around 
r = 0 in the histograms (Figure 6a–e). In behavioral addicts, how-
ever, a slightly broader distribution was observed as compared 
to control subjects, suggesting that more focused correlations 
may be present on the specific pairs of recordings sites in con-
trol subjects, as compared to behavioral addicts (Figure  6c–e). 
Correlations of deoxy-Hb in pairs of recordings sites of both be-
havioral addicts and control subjects also had normal distribu-
tions, with the peaks around r = 0 (Figure 6c–e).
Collectively, these results suggest that PFC activity in the 
right hemisphere is primarily associated with probability judg-
ments in the modified jumping-to-conclusions test, and that 
these deficits are involved in behavioral addiction.
Discussion
In this preliminary study with a relatively small sample size, we 
have shown that behavioral addicts exhibit higher risk taking 
than control subjects, and show compromised probability 
judgments. In contrast, cognitive biases themselves are not 
substantially different between behavioral addicts and con-
trol subjects; although more biased responses were observed 
in the extended version of the cognitive reflection test in be-
havioral addicts than control subjects, this observation was 
primarily due to a significant difference of eFIQ. In economic 
decision-making, behavioral addicts were less risk averse in un-
certain conditions than control subjects. Moreover, the number 
of beads withdrawn in the modified jumping-to-conclusions 
test was not different between behavioral addicts and control 
subjects, indicating no difference in the jumping-to-conclusions 
bias between behavioral addicts and control subjects. However, 
behavioral addicts were worse at making probability judg-
ments to estimate the outcomes (choose the correct bin) based 
on probabilistic events (beads withdrawn). Collectively, an 
emerging picture from these results shows that behavioral ad-
diction may be characterized by compromised probability judg-
ments, which in turn lead to higher risk taking, primarily due to 
deficits in the second signal of the dual process model, whereas 































































































R1R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9R10
R1R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9R10
R1R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9R10




























Figure 4. The fNIRS measurements of PFC activity during the modified jumping-to-conclusions test. (A) A schematic diagram illustrating the emitter (E1, E2) and 
detector (CH1–CH8) probe locations and the recording sites (R1–R10) on the skull. The box below the diagram indicates PFC subregions approximately corresponding 
to each recording site. (B) Graphs showing oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes expressed as the AUC throughout the test at each recording site in BA and CT. (C) Graphs 
showing the t-scores of oxy-Hb (left) and deoxy-Hb (right) changes at each recording site. The dashed lines indicate the thresholds above or below which t-scores are 
statistically significant (P < .05). (D) Color illustrations of the recording sites where significant oxy-Hb (red) and deoxy-Hb (blue) changes were observed during the test. 
The site of overlapping significant oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes is shown as purple. Abbreviations: AUC, area under the curve; BA, behavioral addicts; CT, control 
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fNIRS recordings of PFC activity, which is thought to play a cen-
tral role in the second signal (Satpute and Lieberman, 2006). 
Our study unveiled that PFC activity in the right hemisphere 
is associated with performance on the modified jumping-to-
conclusions test. The PFC activity observed in control subjects 
was absent in behavioral addicts, suggesting that deficits in this 
brain region may be involved in impaired probability judgments 
in behavioral addiction.
There are several major limitations in this study. The first 
and most obvious issue is that this study was conducted with 
a small sample size (n  =  16 for behavioral addicts). Moreover, 
behavioral addicts were heterogeneous in their diagnoses and 
were further divided into groups of even smaller sizes, so that 
the current results should be cautiously interpreted as prelim-
inary evidence. Another limitation is significant differences 
in intelligence levels between behavioral addicts and control 
subjects. We conducted statistical analyses, such as ANCOVA 
and MANCOVA with the eFIQ as a covariate, to account for 
such differences of intelligence level, and found that such dif-
ferences of intelligence level significantly affected performance 
on some tests. Increasing the sample numbers in a future study 
would eventually enable the comparison of behavioral addicts 
and control subjects without considering such intelligence level 
differences.
Kleptomania and paraphilia patients were recruited in this 
study as part of the behavioral addiction group. We investigated 
whether there were any differences between kleptomania and 
paraphilia patients in the tests used in this study, to further 
characterize subtypes of behavioral addiction. To our know-
ledge, no previous study has compared cognitive and affective 
functions directly between these 2 subtypes of behavioral ad-
diction. On average, it appears that there were differences be-
tween kleptomania and paraphilia patients, with paraphilia 
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Figure 5. The fNIRS measurements of PFC activity at the different ratios of the modified jumping-to-conclusions test. Graphs showing (A) oxy-Hb and (B) deoxy-Hb 
changes at each recording site in BA and CT under the different bead ratios, ranging from 9:1 to 6:4. (C) Schematic diagrams of the recording sites with color illustra-
tions where significant oxy-Hb (red) and deoxy-Hb (blue) changes were observed. Abbreviations: AUC, area under the curve; BA, behavioral addicts; CT, control subjects; 
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responses in the modified jumping-to-conclusions test than 
kleptomania patients. However, due to the small sample size, 
the variances were too large, especially in paraphilia patients, 
and none of measurements reached statistical significance; 
therefore, no difference between them is conclusive at this mo-
ment. Comparisons between kleptomania and paraphilia pa-
tients with larger sample sizes in a future study may unveil the 
differences between these subtypes of behavioral addiction.
Previous studies have investigated decision-making in be-
havioral addiction. However, these studies were conducted in 
patients with gambling disorders as a prototypical sector of be-
havioral addiction, and primarily focused on impulsivity (Goodie 
and Fortune, 2013; Ligneul et  al., 2013; Ioannidis et  al., 2019). 
Thus, behavioral addictions other than gambling disorders, 
such as kleptomania and paraphilia, and decision-making and 
judgments other than the aspect of impulsivity, such as risk 
taking and probability judgment, have remained less explored. 
Few studies, if any, have examined cognitive biases with the 
extended version of the cognitive reflection test and the modi-
fied jumping-to-conclusions test in gambling disorders, such 
that whether performance on these questionnaires and psy-
chological tests are also different from control subjects in pa-
tients with gambling disorders remains unclear. In gambling 
disorders, impaired probability judgments have been reported 
(Madden et al., 2009; Andrade and Petry, 2012; Linnet et al., 2012; 
Wiehler and Peters, 2015); this is somewhat consistent with our 
current study, which demonstrates that impaired probability 
judgments are also observed in kleptomania and paraphilia pa-
tients. In contrast, risk taking has been reported inconsistently 
in gambling disorders, with some research reporting more risk 
taking (Ligneul et al., 2013) and other data showing slightly more 
risk aversion (Branas-Garza et al., 2007). Cognitive biases are be-
stowed on various aspects of psychological processes, including 
the bias on self-recognition, such as in Dunning-Kruger effects 
(Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Although our current study did not 
unveil a clear difference in cognitive biases between behavioral 
addicts and control subjects, it is still possible that only some, 
but not all, aspects of cognitive biases may be compromised in 
behavioral addiction. Moreover, affective states influence cog-
nitive biases, and vice versa (Harding et al., 2004; Hallion and 
Ruscio, 2011). Since heightened negative affects, such as stress, 
anxiety, and depressive moods, have been reported in behavioral 
addicts (Blaszczynski and McConaghy, 1989; Akin and Iskender, 
2011; Alavi et al., 2012), augmented cognitive biases by height-
ened negative affects may be involved in behavioral addiction.
In this study, we investigated the neural correlates of per-
formance on a modified jumping-to-conclusions test using 






















































































































































Figure 6. Correlations of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes within the PFC during the modified jumping-to-conclusions test. (A) Heat maps illustrating correlations 
(Pearson’s r) of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb changes in all pairs of the recording sites. (B) Schematic diagrams illustrating correlations in pairs of the recording sites with 
statistically significant P values (P < .05). Positive and negative correlations are illustrated with the red and blue lines, respectively. Histograms with Gaussian fits for (C) 
oxy-Hb and (D) deoxy-Hb correlations, and (E) a cumulative histogram of them, illustrating distribution patterns of Person’s r in BA and CT. Abbreviations: BA, behav-
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test. In particular, decreases of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb concen-
trations were observed in the medial PFCs of control subjects, 
but such changes were absent in behavioral addicts. Ratio-
dependent increases of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb concentrations 
were observed in the right rostrolateral PFCs of behavioral ad-
dicts, but not control subjects, which may partly be owing to the 
ceiling effect: that is, the test was too easy for control subjects 
to work even at the most difficult condition of a 6:4 ratio. A study 
has reported that the left PFC is associated with the jumping-
to-conclusions bias in adult subjects with attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (Lunt et  al., 2012). Thus, our findings 
are strikingly different from this previous study. However, our 
study unveiled deficits not in the jumping-to-conclusions bias, 
but in probability judgments in behavioral addicts. Thus, it is 
possible that the jumping-to-conclusions bias and probability 
judgments are separately associated with the left and right PFC, 
respectively.
In conclusion, our preliminary study provides novel insight 
into characteristics of behavioral addiction pertaining to prob-
ability judgments and consequent risk taking, which may be 
associated with an impaired second signal but relatively intact 
first signal in the dual-process model. The further characteriza-
tion of cognitive and affective processes with a larger sample 
size of behavioral addicts will help in establishing the criteria 
for including impulse-control disorder as a behavioral addiction, 
and understanding its neural mechanisms.
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